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I. Introduction 
Sexual orientation and gender identity are legally-protected 
categories in international human rights law and many States.1  For 
the past two decades, States and regional (and the universal) human 
rights systems have expanded the understanding of anti-
discrimination law in ways that to many seemed unexpected.  Until 
2000, no country had legalized same-sex marriage.2  Less than 
 
† Assistant Professor, Rutgers Law School. 
 1 See Dominic McGoldrick, The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination under International Human Rights Law, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 613 (2016); 
Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination, in 2.2 
COMPARATIVE DISCRIMINATION LAW 14 (2018). 
 2 The Netherlands became the first country in the world to legalize same-sex 
marriage in 2000, with the law taking effect in April 2001. See Same-Sex Dutch Couples 
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twenty years later, more than two dozen countries recognize same-
sex marriage, and many more recognize same-sex civil unions.3  
Along with the recognition of sexual orientation as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination, gender identity has also become a legally 
significant concept for human rights law.4 
In Latin America, a region traditionally labeled as socially 
conservative,5 sexuality laws have also undergone unprecedented 
changes.  In 2008, Uruguay became the first Latin American 
country to legalize civil unions,6 and then promptly turned to discuss 
a same-sex adoption law.7  In March 2010, the Legislative Assembly 
of the Federal District of Mexico made the city the first in Latin 
America to legalize same-sex marriage.8  A few months later, 
Argentina’s National Congress passed a historic reform that made 
it the first Latin American country to legalize same-sex marriage,9 
the field having been opened a few years earlier by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court’s recognition of rights of heterosexual and 
 
Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/20/world/same-sex-dutch-couples-gain-marriage-and-
adoption-rights.html [https://perma.cc/3KSF-KDQJ]. 
 3 See Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, Same-Sex Marriage: Global 
Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (CFR) (last updated Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/same-sex-marriage-global-comparisons 
[https://perma.cc/P4WX-7MKV]. 
 4 See Holning Lau, Gender Recognition as a Human Right, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK ON NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC (Andreas von 
Arnauld, Kerstin von der Decken & Mart Susi eds., forthcoming). 
 5 See Omar G. Encarnación, Latin America’s Rights Riddle: Why the Region Says 
Yes to Same-Sex Marriage and No to Abortion, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/27/latin-americas-rights-riddle/ 
[https://perma.cc/54QR-EEH6]. 
 6 Ley No. 18.246, Unión Concubinaria Regulación [The Concubinary Union Law, 
Law on Concubinage], 10 Jan. 2008 (Uru.). 
 7 See Dario Klein, Uruguay Nears Same-Sex Adoption Law, CNN (Aug. 29, 2009), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/08/27/uruguay.gays/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/PM3J-G2V3]. 
 8 See Elisabeth Malkin, Gay Marriage Puts Mexico City at Center of Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/world/americas/07mexico.html 
[https://perma.cc/C6TY-WVR4]. 
 9 See Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentina Approves Gay Marriage, in a First for Region, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/world/americas/16argentina.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DD4-MCMM]. 
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homosexual couples based on the principle of constitutional 
equality.10 
Such legal developments cannot be understood without an 
examination of the role of Latin America’s human rights court—the 
San Jose-based Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  This 
Article discusses the development of sexual orientation and gender 
identity in the context of inter-American human rights law, in 
particular, by looking at the decisions of the Inter-American Court.11  
The Article focuses on three contentious decisions and one advisory 
opinion, discussing the issues at hand in each case and the ways in 
which the Court has addressed the implications for sexual 
orientation and gender identity, as well as the institutional concerns 
that decisions by international tribunals have upon the law of 
domestic States.  Three cases will be studied to understand these 
implications: Atala and Daughters v. Chile; Duque v. Colombia; 
and Flor Freire v. Ecuador; and Advisory Opinion OC 24-17, 
concerning same-sex marriage and right to name change.  The 
impact of these decisions demonstrates the quick nature in which 
the idea of sexual orientation and gender identity as a protected 
category has changed and developed in a short period of time. 
II. Caselaw on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
This Section discusses the three contentious decisions that the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has handed down on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, as well as the advisory opinion on 
gender identity and same-sex marriage.  The decisions are examined 
in chronological order.  As shown below, the first judgment—Atala 
and Daughters v. Chile—paved the way for subsequent decisions 
on a variety of related matters.  These included the recognition of 
 
 10 See Julieta Lemaitre Ripoll, Love in the Time of Cholera: LGBT Rights in 
Colombia, 11 SUR-INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 73, 75–76 (2009); see also Joshua Goodman, 
Colombia to Recognize Rights of Gays, WASH. POST (June 15, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501449.html [https://perma.cc/ZC7V-E4CH]. 
 11 The Article focuses only on the Inter-American Court’s caselaw.  It should be 
noted, however, that the inter-American system is also comprised of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, a quasi-judicial body that receives and handles human 
rights petitions and submits cases to the Court.  The Commission has been a critical actor 
in the expansion of sexual orientation and gender identity as legal categories.  See, e.g., 
Violence Against LGBTI Persons, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/violencelgbtipersons.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3HJ-HEP3]. 
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economic rights for same-sex couples12 to the finding that all 
members of the Organization of American States should legalize 
same-sex marriage as a question of international law—a doctrine 
that no other international court had thus far articulated.13 
A. The Inter-American Court Breaks Latin American Ground: 
Atala and Daughters v. Chile 
In February 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
held for the first time in its history that sexual orientation and gender 
identity are protected categories under the American Convention on 
Human Rights.14  In a decision labeled as “groundbreaking”15 and 
“historic,”16 the Inter-American Court construed Article 1.1 of the 
American Convention as encompassing a prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (and gender 
identity).17 
 
 12 See Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016). 
 13 State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights 
Derived from a Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of 
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, In Relation to Article 1, of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17].  The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights is the first international tribunal to declare that same-sex marriage 
is an individual right protected by international human rights law. 
 14 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012).  I must disclaim 
that I acted as leading co-counsel in Ms. Atala’s petition before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, and later, in the case before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. 
 15 See Rosa M. Celorio, The Case of Karen Atala and Daughters: Toward a Better 
Understanding of Discrimination, Equality, and the Rights of Women, 15 CUNY L. REV. 
335, 340 (2012). 
 16 See The ICJ Welcomes Historic Decision in Atala v. Chile, INT’L COMM. JURISTS 
(Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.icj.org/the-icj-welcomes-historic-decision-in-atala-v-chile/ 
[https://perma.cc/46UM-84XC]; LGBT Rights Upheld in Historic Inter-American Court 
Ruling, OUTRIGHT ACTION INT. (Mar. 22, 2012), 
https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/lgbt-rights-upheld-historic-inter-american-
court-ruling [https://perma.cc/Z47S-JAGJ]. 
 17 Article 1.1 of the American Convention states: “The States Parties to this 
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure 
to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other 
social condition” (emphasis added).  American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 
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1. Facts and Local Decisions 
The case arose from a 2004 decision by Chile’s Supreme Court 
which stripped Ms. Atala of the custody of her three daughters at 
the request of her ex-husband, who objected to the girls living with 
Ms. Atala and her same-sex partner.18  In 2002, Atala, a criminal 
judge, and her husband, Mr. Ricardo López Allendes, a public 
defender, put an end to a nine-year marriage, and jointly decided 
that Ms. Atala would maintain the care and custody of the three girls 
and that Mr. López would visit them every week.19  At the end of 
2002, Atala’s same-sex partner moved in with her and her three 
daughters.20  In January 2003, López Allende filed a custody suit 
arguing that the girls’ “physical and emotional development was 
seriously at risk” by their mother’s decision to have her same-sex 
partner live with them.21  The applicant also filed a suit for 
provisional custody which the Juvenile Court of Villarrica granted, 
“even though it expressly acknowledged that there was no evidence 
to presume the legal incompetence of the mother.”22  The court 
 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.  The Court found that the two categories were included in the 
open-ended clause “any other social condition.”  Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 91. 
 18 The Supreme Court found that the children must be raised in “a traditional 
Chilean” household, with a father and a mother.  By having her partner move in with the 
family, the Supreme Court declared that Ms. Atala neglected her children’s best interest, 
notwithstanding that the three children had expressly said they wanted to live with their 
mother (and their mother’s partner), and that no expert witness raised objections to Ms. 
Atala’s parenting. See Corte Suprema [C.S.] [Supreme Court], 31 mayo 2004, “Atala 
Riffo,” Rol No. 1193-03, custodia ¶ 20. 
 19 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, at ¶ 30. 
 20 See id. 
 21 The girls’ father argued that Ms. Atala was “not capable of watching over and 
caring for [the three girls, given that] her new sexual lifestyle choice, together with her 
cohabiting in a lesbian relationship with another woman, [were] producing  . . .  harmful 
consequences for the development of these minors  . . . .”  He further claimed that legally 
treating same-sex partners would “distort the meaning of a human couple, man and 
woman, and therefore [would] alter the natural meaning of the family  . . .  since it affects 
the fundamental values of the family, as the core unit of society.”  Finally, López argued 
that it was necessary “to take into account all the consequences of a biological nature that 
would be implied for minors living with a lesbian couple  . . .  solely in terms of diseases, 
given the sexual practices of a lesbian couple, the girls are under constant risk of 
contracting sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes and AIDS.” Id. ¶ 31. 
 22 The Juvenile Court’s main argument was that respondent Atala “has given 
preference to her own well-being and personal interest over carrying out her role as a 
mother, under conditions that could affect the subsequent development of the minors in 
the case.” Id. ¶ 41. 
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advanced an argument that would eventually make its way to the 
Supreme Court and ultimately resulted in the Inter-American 
Court’s rebuke of the Chilean courts.23  The lower court stated that 
there was “no conclusion other than the petitioner [Mr. López] 
presents more favorable arguments on behalf of the best interest of 
the girls, arguments which, in the context of a heterosexual and 
traditional society, take on great importance.”24  Through a 
provisional custody decision, based on a supposed significance of 
reinforcing traditional models of the family, Karen Atala ultimately 
lost custody of her three daughters permanently.25 
Ms. Atala impugned the judge’s impartiality, noting that he had 
already advanced an opinion against homosexuality and was 
therefore unable to render a fair judgment.26  The judge was forced 
to step down and the court’s secretary took up the role of acting 
judge.27  In October 2003, the new judge handed down a merits 
decision, rejecting the petitioner’s custody suit.28  In its merits 
judgment, the court observed that: 
 
The respondent’s sexual orientation was not an impediment to 
carrying out responsible motherhood, that there was no 
psychiatric pathology that would prevent her from exercising her 
‘role as a mother,’ and that there were no indications that would 
allow for the presumption of any grounds for incapacity on the 
part of the mother to take on the personal care of the minors.29 
 
 
 23 See generally id. 
 24 Id. ¶ 41 (quoting decision in the provisional custody proceeding by the Juvenile 
Court of Villarrica, May 2, 2003) (emphasis added). 
 25 Media outlets’ extensive coverage of the case (see Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239) 
caused the Judiciary to open an investigation against Judge Atala based on accusations that 
she had used the government’s property for personal business related to LGBTI rights 
advocacy and that she had disclosed her sexual orientation to members of her chambers.  
A special judge investigator appointed to conduct the investigation concluded that “it 
[was] impossible to sidestep the fact that her peculiar emotional relationship has 
transcended the private sphere with the appearance of the above-mentioned publications, 
which clearly damages the image of both Ms. Atala and the Judiciary.” See id. ¶ 214 
(quoting report prepared by Justice Lenin Lillo of the Court of Appeals of Temuco, April 
2, 2003). See infra, note 60. 
 26 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 232. 
 27 See id. ¶ 43. 
 28 See id. ¶ 44. 
 29 See id. 
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The court’s decision considered significant evidence to rule 
against Mr. López Allende.30  It reviewed reports from international 
organizations, academic institutions, and social workers31 that 
dismissed the claims of an alleged risk for the girls to contract 
sexually-transmitted diseases because of their mother’s sexual 
orientation, and that proved that they lived in a “harmonious family 
environment, with clear rules and limits and a family routine that 
operates appropriately with the supervision of the mother.”32  On the 
argument that the girls could be subject to discrimination, the court 
held that any custody decision must be based on “definite and 
proven facts in the case and not on mere suppositions or fears.”33  
Finally, the court addressed the critical issue of the children’s right 
to be heard, observing that two of them “expressed their desire to 
return to live with their mother” and the third one expressed “a slight 
preference for [living with] the mother.”34 
After the court ordered Mr. López to hand over the girls to Ms. 
Atala, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals of 
Temuco along with a temporary injunction requesting the Court to 
suspend the lower court’s order.35  López argued that “complying 
with the decision would mean a radical and violent change in the 
girls’ current status quo.”36  The Appellate Court ruled in his favor 
and granted the injunction: the girls were to remain with their father 
while the Court reviewed the appeal.37 
The Court of Appeals’ merits decision came down in March 
2004 upholding the district court’s decision that rejected Mr. 
López’s custody lawsuit.38  The Court also reversed the injunction 
previously granted in favor of López.39  With the two merits 
decisions in favor of Atala (and her daughters), it seemed that the 
case was over.  Yet, Mr. López turned to the Supreme Court through 
a disciplinary complaint against the Appellate Court justices, 
 
 30 See id. ¶ 35 n.44, ¶ 58 n.76. 
 31 See id. ¶ 45, 47. 
 32 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 45. 
 33 See id. ¶ 48. 
 34 See id. ¶ 49. 
 35 Id. ¶ 50. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Id. ¶ 51. 
 38 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 52. 
 39 See id. 
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arguing that the justices had acted with “fault and serious and 
flagrant abuse,” ignoring evidence showing that the “open 
expression of lesbian behavior produced directly and immediately 
in [the girls] confusion regarding sexual roles that interfered and 
would later interfere with the development of a clear and defined 
sexual identity.”40  As he had done in the Appellate Court 
proceedings, López also filed an injunction before the Supreme 
Court seeking to maintain the custody of the girls while the Supreme 
Court reviewed the disciplinary matter.41  The Supreme Court 
granted the injunction.42  Despite having two merits decisions in 
their favor, provisional injunctions effectively obstructed Ms. 
Atala’s and her daughters’ efforts to reunite.43 
In May 2004, in a 3-2 judgment, the Supreme Court of Chile 
found that the appellate judges had effectively acted with abuse by 
failing to consider the evidence on “the deterioration of the social, 
family and educational environment of the girls since the mother 
began to cohabit with her homosexual partner, or the possibility that 
the girls could be the target of social discrimination arising from this 
fact.”44  The Court held that Ms. Atala put her own interests before 
those of her children “when she chose to begin to live with a same 
sex partner,” and that there was “potential confusion over sexual 
roles that could be caused  . . .  by the absence from home of a male 
father.”45  Finally, the plurality held that the Court of Appeals had 
neglected the girls’ right “to live and grow within the bosom of a 
family that is structured normally and appreciated in the social 
environment, according to the proper traditional model.”46  Thus the 
Supreme Court put an end to the domestic proceedings in the case.47  
Atala had lost the custody of her daughters, despite the merits 
 
 40 See id. ¶ 53. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. ¶ 56 (describing how Ms. Atala alleges that the court ignored evidence in 
and subsequently granted custody to López, regardless of that evidence). 
 44 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 56 (internal citation omitted). Some of the 
evidence that the Supreme Court refers to in its decision is “the testimony of persons close 
to the girls, such as the house maids [who refer to] games and attitudes of the girls that 
reflect confusion about the sexuality of the mother, which they could have perceived in the 
new cohabitation scheme at their home.” Id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. ¶ 57. 
 47 See id. 
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decisions that had weighed the evidence, including the girls’ own 
statements.48 
In November 2004, Karen Atala filed a petition before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, which initially asked the 
parties—Atala and her daughters and the State of Chile—to seek a 
friendly agreement.49  After two years of negotiations, the 
petitioners decided to put an end to the procedure as it became clear 
that the State was not willing to acknowledge its international 
responsibility.50  The procedure before the Commission was crucial, 
among other things, in allowing the Commission to understand the 
implications of the case and the existence of a violation under the 
American Convention on Human Rights—that despite the 
Convention’s silence on the issue of sexual orientation, it was a 
protected category under inter-American human rights law. 
2. The Inter-American Court’s decision 
In February 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
issued its decision, finding that Chile had violated the rights of 
Karen Atala and her daughters to the equal protection of the laws, 
their right to family life, to privacy, and certain rights concerning 
the judicial protection of their rights.51  Atala broke ground in Latin 
America as it was the first time that the regional human rights court 
expressly addressed the matter of sexual orientation (and gender 
identity—a matter that was not originally part of the petitioners’ 
submission).  In order to do so, the Court based its decision in 
numerous sources of both international and domestic law. 
The judgment’s most salient feature is the finding that the equal 
protection clause of the American Convention on Human Rights 
encompasses the right not to be discriminated on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity.52  The Court started by reiterating 
its doctrine that human rights treaties are “living instruments” that 
 
 48 See id (finding that even though the evidence was not properly considered, placing 
the girls with their father was still appropriate). 
 49 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 31. 
 50 See Jorge Contesse, Settling Human Rights Violations, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. __ 
(forthcoming 2019) (discussing the friendly settlement procedure in the case of Karen 
Atala’s petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). 
 51 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 52 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 86. 
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must be interpreted according to the changing circumstances of 
social life.53  This interpretative departure point is crucial to frame 
the Court’s analysis, as the Court was declaring that, despite the 
American Convention’s silence on the matter, sexual orientation 
and gender identity were in fact prohibited grounds for 
discrimination.  The Court based its holding not only on the 
developments of inter-American law, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, and U.N. treaty bodies54 but also 
on legal developments taking place in Latin American countries.  
The combination of international human rights standards and 
domestic constitutional law allowed the Court to bolster its novel 
finding and set the stage for the subsequent development of 
sexuality rights in Latin American law. 
First, the Court resorted to resolutions adopted by the 
Organization of American States’ General Assembly on the 
protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on 
their sexual orientation.55  The Court’s goal was to show that on the 
inter-American level, States were already moving in the direction of 
granting recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity as a 
matter of regional human rights law.  Second, the Court moved into 
universal human rights law.  It cited communications by the Human 
Rights Committee,56 and general comments by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,57 the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child,58 the Committee against Torture,59 and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,60 
 
 53 See id. ¶ 83. 
 54 See id. ¶ 87–90. 
 55 See id. ¶ 86. The Court pointed to “four successive resolutions referring to the 
protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation, 
demanding the adoption of specific measures for an effective protection against 
discriminatory acts”, four acts were passed in multiple years: “Human rights, sexual 
orientation and gender identity, approved at the fourth plenary session.” Id. ¶ 86 n.97. 
 56 See id. ¶ 88 (citing Toonen v. Australia, indicating that gender encompasses sexual 
orientation). 
 57 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 89. 
 58 See id. ¶ 89. 
 59 Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Application of Article 2 by 
States Parties, CAT/C/GC/2, ¶¶ 20–21 (Jan. 24, 2008). 
 60 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 27. Women of age and the protection of their human rights, 
CEDAW/C/GC/27, ¶ 13 (Dec. 16, 2010); Draft of General Recommendation Nº 28 in 
relation to Article 2 of the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
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that establish that sexual orientation and gender identity are 
protected grounds under international law.  Finally, the Court 
looked at the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights, as 
that court had established, more than a decade earlier, that sexual 
orientation was a protected category under Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.61  With these references, 
the Inter-American Court effectively held that the recognition of 
sexual orientation and gender identity was a universal (and 
European) human rights concern.62 
The Court also added a local basis for its top-down import of 
universal and European law into inter-American human rights law.  
The Court looked to Latin American legislation and case law, 
showing how some countries have recognized sexual orientation 
and gender identity as fundamental human rights.63  In particular, 
the Court looked at case law from the Supreme Court of Mexico64 
and comparative law developments both in Latin America and 
elsewhere.65  The Court used these examples to bolster an argument 
that the State had raised and that—as explained below—States have 
brought up in other cases: the lack of consensus in Latin American 
 
against women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, ¶ 18 (Dec. 16, 2010). 
 61 Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: “The enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status.” Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (June 2010) (emphasis added).  In Atala, the Inter-American 
Court wrongly referred to the European Convention’s clause as “another condition,” not 
“any ground.”  Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 87.  The Inter-American Court cited four 
decisions by its sister court in Europe: Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (No. 
33290/96), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (Dec. 21, 1999); L. and V. v. Austria (No. 39392/98 and 
39829/98), Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶ 45 (Jan. 9, 2003); S.L. v. Austria (No. 45330/99), Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 37 (Jan. 9, 2003); and E.B. v. France (No. 43546/02), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (Jan. 22, 2008). 
 62 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 284. 
 63 Id. ¶¶ 126, 137 (quoting the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, Action of 
Unconstitutionality A.I. 2/2010, August 16, 2010). 
 64 Id. 
 65 The Court noted that “[w]ithin the framework of comparative law some States 
explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in their Constitutions (for 
example Bolivia, Ecuador, Kosovo, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland).” 
Id. ¶ 90 n.113.  The Court expressly referred to recent legislative reform in Argentina, with 
the adoption of same-sex marriage, and Uruguay, with the recognition of civil unions 
between same-sex couples in 2009.  Id. 
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countries on the scope of sexual orientation as a fundamental right.66 
In its response to Ms. Atala’s pleadings, the respondent State 
noted that “sexual orientation was not a suspect category on which 
there was consensus in 2004,”67 and that “it would not be 
appropriate to demand [that the Supreme Court of Chile] pass a 
strict scrutiny test for a category on which the Inter-American 
consensus is recent.”68  The State further made an argument on 
subsidiarity, observing that the Court may damage its “credibility 
and trust” if it “assumes an excessively regulatory role, without 
considering the views of the majority of the States.”69  As explored 
below, the issue of “credibility and trust” has become more 
pressing, especially as the Court furthers its case law on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.70 
The “lack of consensus” argument was a clever one, albeit 
flawed.  According to the State, just as the Inter-American Court 
cites the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to 
buttress its finding that sexual orientation is a protected category 
under human rights law, so should the Court adopt the European 
Court’s “European consensus” doctrine, with its corollary notion of 
the margin of appreciation.71  In the present case, the Inter-American 
Court dismissed the State’s argument, noting that lack of consensus 
 
 66 See id. ¶ 75. 
 67 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 75. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. ¶ 74.  On the principle of subsidiarity in international law, see Paolo G. 
Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003) and Gerald Neuman, Subsidiarity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 360 (D. Shelton ed., 2013). 
 70 See infra Part II.D. 
 71 According to this doctrine, the European Court refrains from adjudicating cases 
that involve public morals whenever it finds that European countries have not reached a 
consensus on the topic.  See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a 
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 382 (1997).  One of 
the most salient applications of the “European consensus” doctrine, relevant to the 
discussion in this Article, is found in the European Court’s refusal to rule that the right to 
marry should be recognized to same-sex couples as a matter of European human rights 
law.  See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (2010).  On 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, see Andrew Legg, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY (2012); 
YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE 
OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002); Marisa Iglesias, 
Subsidiarity, Margin of Appreciation and International Adjudication within a Cooperative 
Conception of Human Rights, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 393 (2017). 
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could not be a valid argument to deny individuals their fundamental 
rights or “to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural 
discrimination that [sexual] minorities have suffered.”72  The Court 
supported its argument with “different international and 
comparative law sources,”73 although the Court only referred to 
reports by Special Rapporteurs and three decisions by the 
Colombian Constitutional Court.74  The Court could have used 
(again) the general comments and communications from treaty 
bodies, as these are the authoritative bodies tasked with interpreting 
major human rights treaties.  It could also have used the European 
Court of Human Rights’ case law and all the legal developments 
found in Latin America.  These could have really articulated a 
reference to “different” sources of international and comparative 
law.  Thus, through a combination of both universal and local 
fundamental rights law, the Court could have framed its rejection to 
the State’s “lack of consensus” argument—a claim that other States 
have also made when called on to account for discriminatory acts 
against same-sex couples.75 
Against the newly-established scope of the right to equality, the 
Inter-American Court addressed the different arguments that the 
Supreme Court of Chile made in its May 2004 decision.  As the 
district court of Villarrica had done in 2003, the Inter-American 
Court plainly rejected the argument that the girls could be subject to 
discrimination due to their mother’s sexual orientation.76  The Court 
held that the justification of “a distinction in treatment and the 
restriction of a right, based on the alleged possibility of social 
discrimination, proven or not  . . .  cannot be used as legal grounds 
for a decision.”77  On the issue of an alleged confusion of sexual 
roles, the Inter-American Court observed that the Chilean court 
“limited itself to the application of a test of speculative damage, 
merely referring  . . .  to the ‘possible confusion of sexual roles’ and 
the ‘situation of risk for the girls’ development’ without specifying 
the connection between said cohabitation and the alleged 
 
 72 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 92. 
 73 Id. ¶ 92 n.114 (emphasis added). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See infra Part II.B. 
 76 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 119. 
 77 Id. 
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deterioration.”78 
Finally, the Court addressed the Chilean court’s assertion that 
the girls had a right to be raised in a family “structured 
normally  . . .  according to the proper traditional model”79 with a 
two-pronged response: (1) the Court noted that the American 
Convention on Human Rights does not define the family and does 
not protect a “traditional” model of it;80 and (2) following a case 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights which used the 
principle of proportionality,81 the Inter-American Court rebuked the 
Chilean court’s judgment as a “limited, stereotyped perception of 
the concept of family, which has no basis in the [American] 
Convention.”82 
As a consequence of the infringement upon Ms. Atala’s right to 
equality and non-discrimination, the Inter-American Court found 
that Chile also violated two other rights: the right to private life and 
the right to family life.83  On the former, the Court held that “Ms. 
Atala’s sexual orientation is part of her private life and therefore any 
interference in it must meet the standards of suitability, necessity, 
and proportionality.”84  The Court then found that the custody 
proceeding had been an “arbitrary interference in [Atala’s] private 
life, given that sexual orientation is part of a person’s intimacy, and 
is not relevant when examining aspects related to an individual’s 
suitability as a parent.”85  On the right to family life, the Court 
reiterated that the American Convention does not protect a specific 
model of family and that Atala, her partner, and Atala’s daughters 
in fact formed a family unit.86  Hence, the Chilean court’s arbitrary 
interference in their private life based on discriminatory grounds 
also affected their right to family life under the American 
 
 78 Id. ¶ 130. 
 79 Id. ¶ 141 (quoting Supreme Court of Chile, Judgment of May 31, 2004). 
 80 Id. ¶ 142. 
 81 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 34–36 
(1999). On the principle of proportionality as a tool for constitutional interpretation, see 
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
(2012); DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004). 
 82 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 145. 
 83 Id. ¶ 161. 
 84 Id. ¶ 165. 
 85 Id. ¶ 167. 
 86 Id. ¶ 176–77. 
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Convention.87 
The Court did not find a violation of the right to judicial 
protection against Ms. Atala.88  The Court established that “neither 
the Commission nor the representatives  . . .  provided specific 
evidence to disprove the presumption that judges’ subjective 
impartiality” against Karen Atala.89  However, the Court did find a 
violation to Ms. Atala’s daughters’ “right to be heard and be duly 
taken into account” when the Supreme Court failed to consider the 
girls’ statements made before the lower courts in the tuition 
proceedings.90 
Finally, the Inter-American Court found that Chile violated 
Atala’s right to equal protection because she was subject to 
disciplinary proceedings based on her sexual orientation.91  It 
concluded this despite the State’s claims that the inquiry followed 
“serious allegations” and was “not at all related to her 
homosexuality, but instead [to]  . . .  complaints and facts verified” 
by an appellate court judge who acted as investigator.92  The 
investigator judge issued a report stating that Ms. Atala received 
visits in her office “by a large number of women” and by her 
partner’s parents, who she introduced “as her in-laws,” and that Ms. 
Atala “openly expressed her homosexuality” to the judge and 
“defended her determination to openly communicate it to the 
Court’s officials and Senior Judges.”93  The Inter-American Court 
concluded “although the disciplinary investigation began with legal 
grounds  . . .  it did investigate this in an arbitrary manner” and was 
therefore a violation of Atala’s right to privacy under the American 
Convention.94 
 
 87 Art. 11(2) of the American Convention states that, “No one may be the object of 
arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his 
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” Art. 17(1) states that, 
“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the state.”  Organization of American States, American 
Convention on Human Rights, art. 11(2), 17(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
 88 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 192. 
 89 Id. ¶ 191. 
 90 Id. ¶ 208. 
 91 Id. ¶ 222.   
 92 Id. ¶ 217. 
 93 Id. ¶ 229. 
 94 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 230. 
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The case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile thus marked the 
beginning of a prominent case law on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.  Despite the outcomes of subsequent decisions, the Inter-
American Court’s jurisprudence has to some extent failed to 
maintain the robustness found in Atala.95  The next sections discuss 
two subsequently contentious decisions adopted by the Inter-
American Court and its Advisory Opinion on gender identity.  All 
of these decisions are based on the Atala precedent, namely, that 
sexual orientation and gender identity are protected categories under 
the American Convention on Human Rights. 
B. Equal Protection and Social Rights: Duque v. Colombia 
1. Facts 
In February 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights handed down its second decision on the rights of LGBTI 
individuals.  In Duque v. Colombia, the Court held that the State’s 
failure to provide a gay man with equal access to public benefits 
following the death of his partner on the grounds that domestic law 
did not recognize such benefits for same-sex couples was a violation 
of the American Convention on Human Rights’ equal protection 
clause.96  The Court based its decision on the Atala doctrine and 
expanded it to issues of discrimination and access to social rights 
concerning same-sex couples.97  The Court, however, did not agree 
with the petitioners on several grounds.  More significantly, two 
judges wrote dissenting opinions concerning some of the critical 
institutional features this Article identifies in the Inter-American 
Court’s expansive jurisprudence.98 
In March 2002, Ángel Alberto Duque submitted a request to the 
Colombian Company Manager of Pensions and Unemployment 
Funds (Compañía Colombiana Administradora de Fondos de 
Pensiones y Cesantías, COLFONDOS S.A.), inquiring whether he 
could obtain the benefits from his recently deceased partner’s 
 
 95 Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016); Flor Freire v. Ecuador, 
Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
315 (Aug. 31, 2016). 
 96 See Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310 
 97 See id. 
 98 See infra Part II.D. 
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pension.99  Duque claimed he lacked financial support and had relied 
on his partner’s assistance during the ten years they lived together 
as a couple.100  Duque, like his deceased partner, was HIV positive 
and needed to cover a prescribed anti-retroviral medication.101  The 
Company denied Duque’s request arguing that Colombia’s law on 
social security, Law 100 of 1993, only contemplated an individual’s 
benefit to receive their deceased partner’s pension if the couple 
consisted of a man and a woman.102  The pension company argued 
that under Colombian law, same-sex couples were precluded from 
obtaining such benefits.103 
Duque filed a tutela action before a district court demanding 
that the court recognize his right to a survivor’s pension.104  His 
main argument was that denying a same-sex partner his deceased 
partner’s pension violated several rights, including the rights to 
equality and to constitute a family, which are protected by both the 
Colombian Constitution and the American Convention on Human 
Rights.105  He also stressed that he lived with HIV and received anti-
retroviral treatment and had no income to cover the treatment.106   
The Tenth Civil Municipal Court of Bogota denied the 
tutela action on two grounds: first, the court held that Mr. Duque 
did not meet the requirements for a beneficiary of a survivor’s 
pension under Colombian law; and second, it noted the matter was 
not to be solved through a tutela (constitutional) procedure, but in 
 
 99 See Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 70. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. ¶ 69. 
 102 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 70. 
 103 Id. 
 104 According to the Colombian Constitution, “[e]very person has the right to file a 
tutela before a judge, at any time or place, through a preferential and summary proceeding, 
for himself/herself or by whomever acts in his/her name for the immediate protection of 
his/her fundamental constitutional rights when that person fears the latter may be violated 
by the action or omission of any public authority.” CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA 
[C.P.] art. 86.  As leading commentators on Colombian constitutional law observe, the 
tutela is “an important symbol of the new [Colombian] constitutional order . . . a kind of 
individual constitutional complaint or special writ for the protection of fundamental 
rights . . . the linchpin of the strategy to make constitutional rights real rather than 
theoretical.”  See MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES 11 (2017). 
 105 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 77. 
 106 Id. 
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an administrative (legal) procedure.107  Duque filed an appeal, but 
the Twelfth Civil Court of Bogotá confirmed the district court’s 
decision, further noting that under Colombian law a family is 
formed through the union of a man and a woman and because a 
survivor’s pension is intended to protect the family, same-sex 
couples are excluded from that benefit.108  Duque then turned to the 
Constitutional Court, but the Court refused to review the case.109 
2. Proceeding before the Inter-American System 
In February 2005, Duque filed a petition before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, arguing that the State had 
violated his rights to personal integrity, fair trial, equal protection, 
and judicial protection.110  Six years later, the Inter-American 
Commission issued an admissibility report111 and in 2014, a merits 
report.112  In October of that year, the Commission took the case 
before the Inter-American Court requesting the Court to declare that 
Colombia had violated Mr. Duque’s rights under the American 
Convention on Human Rights.113 
One of the most distinctive features of the case is the significant 
developments in Colombian law that occurred between the time Mr. 
Duque filed the tutela, in 2002, and the time he initiated proceedings 
before the Inter-American Commission, in 2005,—and even after 
the case was lodged before the Commission, in 2014.  Indeed, the 
Colombian State prominently asserted such developments as a 
defense that the Inter-American Court should not find Colombia 
internationally responsible.114  The first development occurred in 
2007, when the Colombian Constitutional Court held that the 1990 
 
 107 Id. ¶ 78. 
 108 The Circuit Court held that “the survivor’s pension is intended to protect the 
family . . . formed by the union of a man and a woman, the only beings capable of 
preserving the species through procreation . . . a homosexual union between a man with a 
man or a woman with a woman does not, in itself, constitute a family.”  Twelfth Civil 
Court of Bogotá, Judgment of 19 July 2002, at 92–93 (cited in Duque v. Colombia, ¶ 79).  
 109 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 80. 
 110 Duque v. Colombia, Case 12841, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 5/14 
(2014) [hereinafter Duque Merits Report]. 
 111 Duque v. Colombia, Case 123-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 150/11 
(2011). 
 112 See Duque Merits Report, supra note 110. 
 113 See Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310. 
 114 Id. 
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Law No 54 (which regulates de facto marital unions) also applied to 
same-sex couples.115  The Constitutional Court granted same-sex 
couples the same pension and social security benefits as those 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples, finding that there was no 
constitutional justification for the differentiated treatment between 
same-sex couples and heterosexual couples with regard to access to 
a survivor’s pension.116  The following year, the Court handed down 
a critical decision: in Judgment C-336, the Court held that same-sex 
couples who prove their status as “permanent couples” had the right 
to a survivor’s pension—the core of Mr. Duque’s claim before the 
inter-American system.117  Subsequently, the Court explained that 
the scope of Judgment C-336 extended to situations that occurred 
before the decision and that same-sex couples could use any of the 
mechanisms available to heterosexual couples to prove their 
status—until that point, same sex-couples could only use one 
evidentiary mechanism.118 
According to the State, the decisions adopted by the 
Constitutional Court between 2007 and 2011 had radically changed 
the legal landscape for same-sex couples in Colombia.119  In 
particular, the State argued that “the [international] illicit act ceased 
with Judgment C-336 of 2008 . . . and Judgment T-051 of 2010 
consolidated the jurisprudential precedent for the protection of 
same-sex couples’ pension rights.”120  Despite these allegations, the 
Inter-American Court dismissed the State’s claim.  It held that at the 
time Duque filed his request with the Colombian Company of 
Pension Funds—that is, March 2002—Colombia’s law relating to 
the right of same-sex couples to a survivor’s pension violated the 
right of equality, as enshrined in the American Convention and, as 
a result, Colombia was responsible for an international wrongful 
 
 115 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2007, juicio C-075 
(Colom.) ¶¶ 6.2.3.2, 6.2.4, 6.4 (quoted in Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 81). 
 116 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 81 (quoting Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court], octubre 3, 2007, Sentencia C-811/07, ¶ 6 (Colom.)). 
 117 Id. ¶ 82 (quoting Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16, 
2008, Sentencia C-336/08 (Colom.)). 
 118 Id. (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-051/10, 
febrero 2, 2010, ¶ 6.7 (Colom.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
noviembre 15, 2011, Sentencia T-860/11, (Colom.)). 
 119 Id. ¶ 40. 
 120 Id. 
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act.121 
The Court reiterated its Atala doctrine, whereby sexual 
orientation is a protected category under the American Convention, 
and that whenever a State wishes to limit the rights of an individual 
based on their sexual orientation (or gender identity) it must provide 
a compelling reason.122  The Court noted that the State failed to 
provide an “objective and reasonable justification” for the 
differentiated treatment to same-sex couples in 2002.123  As in Atala, 
the Court in Duque reviewed relevant international human rights 
standards, this time with a focus on the practice of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.124  The Court also 
surveyed the law of certain Latin American States, thus grounding 
its “universal human rights” claims on the practice of local Latin 
American law—a method of adjudication that the Court has used in 
other socially contentious areas, such as reproductive rights.125   
Here, the Court reiterated an important argument—used in 
Atala, Flor Freire, and the 2017 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17—on 
the “lack of consensus within some countries” (emphasis added) as 
to the full respect of the rights of sexual minorities.126  The Court 
repeated its Atala doctrine: “the fact that this is a controversial issue 
in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter 
 
 121 Id. ¶ 99. 
 122 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 106. 
 123 Id. ¶ 124.  The Court, however, did not find the State responsible for the violation 
of the rights to fair trial and personal integrity.  The Court was satisfied with the State’s 
claim that domestic courts did not reject Duque’s tutela action due to discrimination and 
stereotype.  The Court observed that domestic courts referred Mr. Duque to the proper 
judicial proceedings to claim the pension benefits and that no proof was offered that 
Colombia did not have an effective judicial remedy to claim the payment of social benefits.  
Id. ¶¶ 155–57.  Further, the Inter-American Court observed that the petitioner was not able 
to establish that Colombian courts based their decisions on stereotypes and other 
considerations beyond what Colombian law expressly stated at the time.  Id. ¶¶ 164–65.  
On the allegation concerning the right to life and personal integrity, the Court noted that 
Colombian law contemplates protections for HIV positive individuals and that Mr. Duque 
failed to prove the “tremendous emotional burden,” Id. ¶ 184, that he allegedly suffered as 
a result of the situation as no “medical reports, analysis or tests” were provided by his 
attorneys, Id. ¶ 187, and that he also failed to prove that the subsidiary system for social 
benefits would have provided fewer benefits than the contributive system. Duque v. 
Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 191. 
 124 Id. ¶¶ 108–09. 
 125 See Jorge Contesse, The Final Word? Constitutional Dialogue and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 15 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 414, 427 (2017). 
 126 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 123. 
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of consensus, cannot lead this Court to abstain from issuing a 
decision.”127  This assertion contrasts with the approach favored by 
the European Court of Human Rights, which, as already explained, 
has precisely used the lack of a “European consensus” to deny the 
existence of a right to marry under the European Convention of 
Human Rights.128 
Significantly, the Inter-American Court “note[d] the parties’ 
submission that the Colombian Constitutional Court modified the 
domestic legislation in the sense of granting same-sex couples 
access to survivors’ pension.”129  The Court, however, observed that 
some “controversies persist[ed] as the requirements to establish the 
status of surviving partner, and the retroactive effect of the 
normative change.”130  In particular, the Court noted two issues: 
first, the three-year statute of limitations for claims for a survivor’s 
pension could affect the petitioner, effectively depriving him of 
compensation dating back to his 2002 claim;131 and second, it was 
unclear whether Mr. Duque would obtain the totality of the pensions 
he failed to receive since 2002 as a result of the discrimination he 
suffered.132  These were the grounds that the Court used to proceed 
with the review of the case, despite the noted change in legislation 
in Colombia, and to ultimately hold Colombia responsible for the 
violation of the right to equal protection of Mr. Duque under the 
American Convention.133 
The inter-American human rights community expected Duque 
to be a further development in the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisprudence on LGBTI rights, in particular, concerning the 
function of social rights.134  The Inter-American Commission 
expressly framed the petition as a social-rights one when it 
 
 127 Id. (quoting Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 92 (Feb. 24, 2012)). 
 128 See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (2010). 
 129 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 130. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. ¶ 134. 
 132 Id. ¶ 136.  The Court further noted: “it is reasonable to conclude that the 
international unlawful act has not yet been repaired in its entirety because the retroactive 
payments that Mr. Duque could receive may not be equivalent to what he would have 
received had he not been a victim of discrimination.”  Id. ¶ 137. 
 133 Id. ¶ 138. 
 134 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, ¶ 10 (referring to the amici briefs submitted 
before the Court). 
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submitted the case before the Court.135  Duque was a second-
generation case, developing the case law initiated with Atala in 
2012.  Ultimately, however, the Court seemed to have lost sight of 
some of the fundamental legal and institutional issues at hand.  By 
forcing a decision, the Court unnecessarily eroded some key 
functions of international adjudication, including the principles of 
complementarity and subsidiarity.   The Court came to its decision 
notwithstanding the clear and solid evidence that Colombian same-
sex couples were no longer in the situation of Mr. Duque in 2002, 
and that at that time neither Colombian law nor Inter-American 
human rights law granted same-sex couples (and individuals) the 
same rights as heterosexual couples (and individuals).136  Its main 
argument was that it was “not possible to fully know” whether Mr. 
Duque would receive the benefits to which he was entitled, despite 
the State’s claims that he would.137  Instead of forcing an 
international conviction against Colombia, a country where—as the 
Court itself acknowledged—social rights are judicially protected, 
the Court could have remanded the case to domestic authorities to 
solve Mr. Duque’s situation.138 
The two dissenting opinions filed in the case point in this 
direction.  Judge Manuel Ventura Robles, writing his last vote as a 
sitting judge in the Court, posed a direct question:  
 
How could the Court not apply the complementarity principle and 
accept the State’s objection of the petitioner’s failure to exhaust 
domestic remedies if the State, through the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment, amended its domestic case law and opened the doors to 
the reparation of the alleged facts? What else could the State do to 
remedy the violation?139   
 
 135 See Inter-Amer. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Takes Case involving Colombia to the 
Inter-American Court, Press Release No. 144/14 (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2014/144.asp 
[https://perma.cc/DL44-A5Z3]. 
 136 Id. ¶ 129–36. 
 137 Id. 
 138 For a discussion on the judicialization of social rights in Colombia, see Cesar 
Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669 (2011) and MANUEL CEPEDA 
ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES (2017). 
 139 Duque v. Colombia, (ser. C) No. 310, at 2 (separate dissenting opinion by Ventura 
Robles, J.). 
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Similarly, in a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Eduardo Vio 
Grossi noted first that the Court could not, as the American 
Convention establishes, “rule, as Article 63.1 [of the American 
Convention] mandates, that the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated since that had 
already occurred.”140  Second, Judge Vio criticized the Court for the 
use of secondary sources of international law as if they were 
primary ones (like treaties or customary international law).141  
Finally, Judge Vio objected to the claim that Colombia failed to 
contrast its domestic legislation against international law, the Inter-
American doctrine known as “conventionality control.”142  Judge 
Vio noted that, at the time of submission of the original petition, 
there was no international obligation to grant recognition to same-
sex couples.143  Therefore, the State’s act denying Mr. Duque of the 
survivor’s pension was not—and could not have been—an 
international wrongful act.144 
C. Perceived Sexual Orientation as a Protected Category: 
Flor Freire v. Ecuador 
A few months after the Inter-American Court handed down its 
Duque judgment, it decided the case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador.145  
In Flor Freire, the Court applied the Atala precedent—namely, that 
sexual orientation is a protected category under inter-American 
human rights law—in the context of military disciplinary 
proceedings and in the situation of both actual and perceived sexual 
orientation, a situation where an individual’s right to have his honor 
respected was also at issue.146 
 
 140 Id. at 3 (separate dissenting opinion by Vio Grossi, J.) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 141 Id. at 9 (“[I]t is not stated that international law may not or shall not regulate the 
situation of same-sex couples in the future . . . but that such regulations must be 
contemplated by some source of international law, that is, a treaty, customary law or 
general principles of law applicable to States parties to the Convention, or to the actual 
State at hand pursuant to a unilateral act. None of this occurs in the present case.”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 13. 
 144 See id. at 10. 
 145 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 315 (Aug. 31, 2016). 
 146 In Flor Freire, the Court also addressed issues concerning the right to judicial 
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Homero Flor Freire was a Military Police official, who reached 
the rank of lieutenant and remained an active-duty member of the 
Ecuadorian Army until his separation from the army in 2002.147  In 
2000, Mr. Flor Freire was involved in an incident which has 
disputed factual accounts.  According to several military officers, 
on November 19, 2000, Flor Freire and another soldier were having 
sex in Flor’s room.148  This was the narrative that the Ecuadorean 
authorities used to dismiss Flor from the army.149  According to the 
petitioner’s account, however, while he was on duty, he saw an 
intoxicated official outside the Major Coliseum in the city of Shell 
Mera, province of Pastaza, where a party was taking place.150  Flor 
observed that the official was “having problems” with some people 
attending the party and that he was “putting himself at risk and 
affecting the honor and reputation of the army.”151  He then decided 
to take the intoxicated officer to the Amazonas Military Fort.152  
After the officer attempted to return to the party, Flor decided to 
move him to his room where there was an extra bed.153  Soon after 
he entered the room, a Major entered the room and told Flor Freire 
that he was in trouble and that “witnesses had seen him in acts of 
homosexuality.”154  The senior officer asked Flor to turn over his 
standard-issue weapon.155 
Military authorities commenced a disciplinary process against 
Mr. Flor Freire based on Article 117 of the Regulations of Military 
Discipline, which sanctioned members of the Armed Forces “caught 
in acts of homosexuality.”156  In January 2001, the Military Court of 
 
guarantee and fair trial.  See id. ¶¶ 159–211.  Since these considerations do not concern 
issues of sexual orientation and gender identity, they fall outside the scope of this Article 
and, therefore, are not discussed here. 
 147 Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12.743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
81/13, ¶ 12 (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12743fondoen.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR4T-
S4W4]. 
 148 Id. ¶ 32. 
 149 See id. 
 150 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 57. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 61. 
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Law found against Flor and concluded that he must be put on leave 
before being discharged pursuant to Article 117 of the Regulations 
of Military Discipline.157  Although Flor Freire denied the facts—
and denied even being a homosexual—he argued that the 
disciplinary proceeding violated the Ecuadorean Constitution, 
which enshrines “the right to take free and responsible decisions on 
one’s sexual life.”158 
The Military Court rejected the argument, noting that: 
 
The Constitution of Ecuador . . . guarantees the right to make free 
and responsible decisions about their sexual life. Nonetheless, in 
the armed forces, Article 117 of the Rules of Military Discipline 
is in force; it punishes acts of homosexuality, precisely because 
of the special nature of the military legislation, its philosophy and 
constitutional mission, to cultivate and keep intact and unified 
values such as honor, dignity, discipline . . . extolling civic-
mindedness, exalting respect for the national symbols and the 
Ecuadorian nation, in view of the ethical and moral values it 
practices, and which are the essential elements of the integral 
training of the soldier, all of which is not compatible [with the] 
conduct and behavior adopted by the persons investigated since 
they are contrary to principles and norms of conduct that all 
members of the Armed Forces are obligated to observe, the 
Armed Forces being proud to be the moral reservoir of society, 
and to have in its ranks men of integrity, capable, responsible, and 
with unblemished moral authority that enables them to guide and 
lead their subordinates in operations [and] activities particular to 
the military career.159  
 
In May 2001, the Council of Subaltern Officers upheld the 
 
 157 The Military Court held that Flor Freire and the other officer “subjectively 
offended the armed institution, affecting its prestige and reputation . . . causing a scandal 
and setting a bad example both at the Military Front and in front of the general public.”  
Id. ¶ 76 (quoting Court of Law, Fourth Military Zone, Resolution of Jan. 17, 2001). 
 158 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 1998, art. 23.  The current 
Constitution also protects “[t]he right to freely take informed, voluntary, and responsible 
decisions on one’s sexuality and one’s sexual life and orientation.” THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 2008, art. 66. 
 159 Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12.743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
81/13, ¶ 40 (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12743fondoen.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR4T-
S4W4] (quoting Court of Law, Fourth Military Zone, Resolution of Jan. 17, 2001). 
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Military Court’s decision, and in July of that year the Council of 
Superior Officers followed suit.160  After the Military Court’s 
decision, Flor Freire filed a constitutional injunction (amparo) 
before the Sixth Civil Court of Pichincha.161  In July 2001, the court 
denied the injunction noting that the amparo action was out of order, 
because it was not directed against an act itself with respect to which 
the court could make a finding of its illegitimacy.162  Flor appealed 
the decision and, in February 2002, the Second Chamber of the 
Constitutional Court upheld the court’s decision.163  A few weeks 
earlier, Flor Freire had finally been discharged.164 
A remarkable feature of the case is that, after the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights issued its merits report in November 
2013 making recommendations to the State, Ecuador expressed its 
willingness to comply with the Commission’s report.165  
Furthermore, following the report, in July 2014 the State held a 
public act of atonement at the Ministry of National Defense, where 
it unveiled a plaque in honor of Mr. Flor Freire and publicly 
apologized to him “for being dismissed . . . in an arbitrary and 
unjustified manner, in violation of his constitutional rights.”166  The 
State’s attitude suggested that the inter-American human rights 
standard set forth in Atala had already been internalized.  The reason 
the Inter-American Court had to move forward with the case, in 
spite of the State’s public act of apology, was the State’s 
unwillingness to acknowledge its international responsibility, 
similarly to what transpired in the Duque case.167 
The Inter-American Court’s decision in Flor Freire is mainly of 
interest for two reasons.  First, it introduced the notion of 
“discrimination by perception” and, second, ruled on the issue of 
 
 160 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶¶ 79–82. 
 161 Id. ¶ 83. 
 162 Id. ¶ 94. 
 163 Id. ¶ 98. 
 164 Id. ¶ 100. 
 165 Id. ¶¶ 34–36. 
 166 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 37. 
 167 Homero Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Case 12.743, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
81/13, ¶ 33 (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12743fondoen.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR4T-
S4W4]. 
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sexual orientation within the Armed Forces.168  Following 
developments in international human rights law, the Court observed 
that the “concept of ‘discrimination by perception’ is contemplated 
in several international instruments,”169 as well as the caselaw and 
legislation of numerous countries.170  The fact that the petitioner did 
not identify as a homosexual man was of paramount importance, 
but, the Court observed, he had nonetheless been a victim of 
discrimination on the grounds of his perceived sexual orientation.171 
The Court noted that restrictions to sexual relations inside 
military facilities were not per se unreasonable, but that Ecuador 
had failed to justify why same-sex relations were subject to harsher 
punishment than heterosexual relations.172  As a result, the Court 
found Ecuador internationally responsible for violating Mr. Flor 
Freire’s rights to equality and to have his honor respected, as 
recognized by the American Convention.173 
The second notable feature of the decision is the Court’s 
analysis of sexual orientation within the context of Armed Forces.  
The Court noted that there was no inter-American standard on the 
matter, but following the caselaw of the European Court of Human 
Rights,174 and the caselaw and legislation of several Latin American 
countries,175 it concluded that the prohibition against discrimination 
“encompasses all spheres of personal development . . . hence, the 
exclusion of individuals from the armed forces based on their sexual 
orientation, whether real or perceived, is against the American 
 
 168 See Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶¶ 118–20. 
 169 The Court cited the 1999 Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (art. 1); the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution on Protection against Violence 
and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or imputed 
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity; and the Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination and violence against individuals 
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.  Id. ¶ 122. 
 170 The Court referred to decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada, and American, 
French, and British legislation.  Id. at n.177. 
 171 See id. ¶ 120. 
 172 Id. ¶ 127. 
 173 Id. ¶¶ 156–57. 
 174 Flor Freire v. Ecuador, (ser. C) No. 315, ¶ 130. 
 175 The Court referred to cases from Colombia, Brazil and Peru, and to legislative 
changes in Argentina and Chile.  See id. ¶¶ 131–35. 
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Convention.”176   
With this third contentious decision, the Court solidified its 
caselaw on sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for 
discrimination.  It expanded the Atala precedent to different areas, 
such as social rights (as seen in Duque), the special situation of 
armed forces, and the significance of both real and perceived 
discrimination (Flor Freire). 
D. Same-sex Marriage: Does the Court Go Ultra Vires? 
On January 9, 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Inter-American Court or Court) released an advisory opinion on 
Gender Identity, Equality, and Non-Discrimination of Same-Sex 
Couples.177  The Court declared that the change of name and the 
rectification of public records and identity documents to conform to 
a person’s gender identity are protected by the American 
Convention on Human Rights.178  Additionally, the Court 
maintained that states must extend all existing legal mechanisms—
including marriage—to same-sex couples.179 
The Opinion arose from a request made by Costa Rica for the 
Court to interpret the scope of the right to privacy, the right to a 
name, and the right to equal protection of the laws under the 
American Convention on Human Rights.180  Costa Rica observed 
that the protection of rights relating to sexual rights and gender 
identity vary significantly across the countries of the Organization 
of American States (OAS), and that further clarification as to what 
amounts to discrimination was needed.181 
The Court established that the change of a name, as well as the 
rectification of the image and the sex or gender in public records 
 
 176 Id. ¶ 136 (emphasis added). 
 177 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. ¶ 2.  Costa Rica asked the Court to address the following issues: (i)Whether 
states must “recognize and facilitate the name change of an individual in accordance with 
his or her gender identity”; (ii) Whether the lack of administrative procedures for name 
change in such circumstances could be considered contrary to the American Convention 
on Human Rights; (iii) Whether the American Convention requires states to recognize all 
patrimonial rights that derive from a same-sex relationship; and (iv) Whether there must 
be a specific mechanism to govern relationships between persons of the same sex for the 
state to recognize all the economic rights that derive from that relationship. 
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and identity documents is a right protected by the American 
Convention.182  Such a right is found in general principles pertaining 
to the right to a name and the right to identity, as articulated by 
international human rights bodies.183 
In its arguably most groundbreaking section, the Court’s 
opinion addressed—and ultimately went beyond—two specific 
questions related to the patrimonial rights derived from 
relationships between persons of the same sex: first, that legal 
standards apply to said relationships, and second, the mechanisms 
that states should use to recognize and protect such relationships.184  
On the question of the legal standards that apply to same-sex 
relationships, the Court found that an interpretation of the concept 
of “family”—a notion that, as explained, the American Convention 
does not define—that failed to encompass same-sex relationships 
“would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.”185  
Although the Convention’s drafters did not consider such issues, the 
Court declared that “by recognizing this type of family, the Court is 
adhering to the original intention [of the drafters].”186    
The Court thus fashioned an expansive interpretation of its 
advisory jurisdiction, finding that “the protection of the family 
relationship of a same-sex couple goes beyond mere patrimonial 
rights issues,”187 and that all types of rights—whether civil, political, 
economic or social—“applicable to the family relationships of 
heterosexual couples” should also extend to same-sex couples.188  
Costa Rica had submitted a question about patrimonial rights, but 
the Court handed down a response regarding all rights—what the 
Romans called ultra vires.189 
Finally, with regard to the mechanisms that States should use to 
protect same-sex relationships, the Court reviewed the international 
and comparative practice on the subject, citing its own case law, the 
 
 182 Id. ¶ 116. 
 183 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶¶ 107–11. 
 184 See id. ¶ 140.  See also Macarena Saez, In the Right Direction: Family Diversity 
in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 317, 338 (2019). 
 185 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶ 189; see also Saez, supra note 
184, at 21. 
 186 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶ 193. 
 187 Id. ¶ 198. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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opinions of United Nations treaty bodies, the European Court of 
Human Rights’ case law, and the practice of a wide range of 
Organization of American States members.190  It noted that “States 
can adopt diverse types of administrative, judicial and legislative 
measures to ensure the rights of same-sex couples,” and observed 
that extending already-existing institutions—including marriage—
to same-sex couples is “the most simple and effective way” to 
ensure the realization of the standards set forth by the advisory 
opinion.191  However, the Court concluded that the existence of “two 
types of formal unions” is “inadmissible.”192 
III. Impact 
The Inter-American Court’s case law on sexual orientation and 
gender diversity has dramatically expanded in a relatively short 
period of time.193   The first decision on the matter—Atala, where 
the Court held that sexual orientation and gender identity are 
protected categories under inter-American human rights law—came 
down in 2012.194  Six years later, the Court had expanded its doctrine 
to declare that the right to equality—a right that the Inter-American 
Court has notably declared a jus cogens norm—mandates all 
Organization of American States, including those that are not parties 
to the American Convention, to legalize same-sex marriage.195 
As the Court has noted in all its decisions on these matters, Latin 
American States have been moving towards granting recognition to 
sexual orientation and gender identity.196  In this sense, it is possible 
to situate the Court’s case law as part of a larger conversation taking 
place among, and within, States.  The Court can engage with States 
in two ways: first, it can seek to impose its own understanding of 
the scope of rights, as it did in its advisory opinion, where it held 
that the opinion has legal relevance for all OAS members, without 
 
 190 Id. ¶¶ 201–05. 
 191 Id. ¶ 218. 
 192 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13, ¶ 224. 
 193 See Saez, supra note 184, at 13–15. 
 194 See Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 91 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 195 See id. ¶ 79; see also Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13.  In contrast, the 
European Court of Human Rights declared more than two decades ago that sexual 
orientation is a protected category under the European human rights treaty, but it has yet 
to declare that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples. 
 196 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 13. 
2019 SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY 383 
making a distinction between American Convention member States 
and non-member States, and where it went beyond the scope of the 
questions that had been submitted to it.  A notorious problem with 
this form of engagement is seen in the unprecedented backlash 
against the Court, following its Advisory Opinion OC 24/17:197 the 
Court’s decision caused a Costa Rican presidential candidate 
running on a platform against the Inter-American Court to go from 
having little support to becoming the front-runner in a general 
election.198 
Second, the Court can deepen its adjudication method whereby 
it engages with domestic constitutional developments to bolster its 
own findings, as seen in Atala and other cases.199  Here the Court 
acts more as a partner of constitutional courts and allows their voice 
to become “inter-American” by way of the Court’s rulings.  For 
instance, by inviting ample submissions on the issues before it,200 
the Court has remarkably opened its doors to public participation.  
In order to solidify its authority, particularly in a context of growing 
resistance against international human rights law, the Court should 
refrain from seeking to decide all matters and be open to sometimes 
“leaving things undecided,”201 let States decide—or at least seek 
forms of implementation of the general principles laid out by the 
regional court. 
In any event, the Court’s caselaw has also significantly impacted 
domestic law.  After the Court’s advisory opinion was issued in 
January 2018, the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican 
Constitutional Court requested an opinion from the country’s 
Attorney General’s Office, which declared that the Inter-American 
 
 197 See Latin America’s Human-Rights Court Moves into Touchy Territory, THE 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/02/01/latin-
americas-human-rights-court-moves-into-touchy-territory [https://perma.cc/3GYF-
6WRY]. 
 198 Id. On backlash against the Inter-American Court, see Jorge Contesse, Resisting 
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2019), and 
Ximena Soley & Silvia Steininger, Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, backlash 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 14 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 237 (2018). 
 199 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 276–77 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 200 See id. ¶¶ 10, 17–23. 
 201 I take the phrase from Cass Sunstein’s work on judicial minimalism.  See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3 (2001). 
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Court’s advisory opinion is binding upon Costa Rican judges.202  
Also, the country’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that 
individuals may now change their name at will according to their 
gender identity, in conformity with the Inter-American Court’s 
decision.203  In Chile, the Supreme Court applied the advisory 
opinion to rule that a trans individual had a right to a name change 
without the need to undergo surgery or hormonal treatment.204  
Similarly, the adoption of Chile’s recent law on gender identity was 
influenced by the Court’s caselaw, from Atala to OC-24/17.205  In 
Ecuador, a nine-year old trans girl successfully obtained a judicial 
pronouncement to have her name changed, in a decision that 
partially relied on the Inter-American Court’s OC 24/17.206   
It remains to be seen how the irruption of conservative political 
movements in Latin America will affect the politics of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in the region.207 
 
 202 Laura Alvarado, Costa Rica’s Attorney General Confirms Ruling of Inter-
American Court Regarding Same Sex Marriage is Binding, THE COSTA RICA STAR (May 
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[https://perma.cc/ZBB4-D7BK]. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity in 
international and domestic law is an impressive phenomenon.  
Courts all around the world have expanded the contours of what 
used to be a heteronormative body of law, allowing same-sex 
couples and gender non-conforming individuals to claim their rights 
as human rights.  In Latin America, a region where conservative 
political forces have exercised significant power, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ caselaw on sexual orientation 
and gender identity has become a crucial driver of social change.  
The Court has reinterpreted the regional human rights norms 
allowing for local developments that have expanded the enjoyment 
of rights.  As the Court’s caselaw expands, however, so does the 
pushback against the Court and, more generally, human rights law.  
Human rights lawyers and scholars—and the Court itself—must 
find ways to contain the resistance against the Court before the 
retrenchment of rights that is already seen in the region reverses the 
wins of the past decade. 
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